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Abstract
This paper analyzes cheap talk in an investment model with information
externalities. In contrast to Gossner and Melissas (2006), I allow for (i) com-
petition eﬀects, (ii) positive network externalities and (iii) more than one in-
terviewed player. In the presence of competition eﬀects, a player will never
truthfully reveal her information about the realized state of the world. In the
presence of positive network externalities, however, there exists a parameter
range where, under mild additional conditions, the unique equilibrium is the
separating one. Finally, using numerical computations, I show that for a suﬃ-
ciently large number of interviewed players there exists a separating equilibrium
in my entire parameter range.
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11 Introduction.
People often take actions or adopt strategies which are observed and can potentially
be imitated by many other people. For example if a person buys equity in the stock-
market then this signals to the other market participants that that person believes
that the true value of the asset lies above its current price1. Similarly when bank
depositors withdraw all their money this signals to other depositors that they pos-
sess some bad information concerning its repayment ability (Chari and Jagannathan
(1997)). Technologies which have been successfully tested in one ﬁrm often get rapidly
imitated by many other ﬁrms. This process of learning by observing others is called
social learning, and it has recently been receiving considerable attention from mem-
bers of the economics profession.
The ﬁrst models to stress the ineﬃciencies associated with this form of learning are
Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (BHW, 1992). In these
models all agents possess some private information concerning the desirability of an
investment action. People move in an exogenous order, and everyone observes the
action of his predecessors. They ﬁnd that if early movers decide to invest, then all
subsequent movers will neglect their own private information and will ineﬃciently
herd on the investment decisions of the few early movers. In these two papers people
move in an exogenous order, i.e. they do not have the possibility to wait and see
how many other optimists are present in the economy. Chamley and Gale (CG, 1994)
introduced strategic waiting in an investment model similar to the one of BHW. They
showed that if investors have the possibility to wait, social learning remains very in-
eﬃcient because too little learning will occur in equilibrium.
These original models of social learning crucially rest on the assumption that infor-
mation is only transmitted via actions and not via words. Typically, this assumption
is defended by the claim that ”actions speak louder than words”. However this claim
raises two objections: a practical and a theoretical one.
From a theoretical point of view we know from standard game-theoretical textbooks
(see e.g. Gibbons (1992)) that cheap talk can be very informative as well. For exam-
ple, if preferences are perfectly aligned, i.e. if low sender types prefer a low receiver’s
action and high sender types prefer a high receiver’s action, then a lot of useful in-
formation can simply be transmitted via cheap talk.
In practice we observe that a lot of information is transmitted via words. For ex-
1For a model of herding in a ﬁnancial market mechanism see Avery and Zemsky (1998)
2ample every now and then a famous entrepreneur and/or economist appears in the
news giving his opinion about the current and future economic prospects, whether
the investment climate is favourable or not, etc... Similarly marketing agencies organ-
ise opinion polls in which a large number of persons are asked their opinions about
existing and new products, advertisements, new laws passed by the parliament, etc...
Some opinion polls also ask to a large number of investors how they believe the fu-
ture economic environment will look like and whether they intend to invest or not
and how much. Theoretically these information channels are puzzling. Even a famous
entrepreneur (henceforth we call her a guru) whose opinion on economic matters is
asked by the media is not sure whether her opinion is correct or not. This paper
analyses her incentives to truthfully report her opinion, given that she has the pos-
sibility to wait and learn the other market participant’s opinions before making her
investment decision. In this context, since both a pessimistic as an optimistic guru
wants to engage in social learning, it is not clear why a pessimistic guru would want
to send a diﬀerent signal to the remaining market participants as an optimistic one.
We analyse a two-stage communication waiting game similar to the one originally
studied by Gossner and Melissas (2006). In the second stage investors play a waiting
game similar to the one studied by CG. All players must make an investment decision
and possess a private signal concerning the future state of the world. Investment is
only proﬁtable in the good state. In the good (bad) state of the world a majority
of players are optimists (pessimists). Everyone can invest in both periods. In the
second period, everyone observes how many players invested in the ﬁrst period, and
make their ﬁnal investment decisions. As shown by Chamley (1997) this waiting game
may exhibit two stable equilibria. In the low activity equilibrium all optimists play
a waiting game and invest with a symmetric equilibrium probability λ∗. In the high
activity equilibrium everyone (both the optimists and the pessimists) invest in the
ﬁrst period. This latter equilibrium only exists if the cost of the investment project
is relatively low so that even pessimists are willing to invest. This equilibrium yields
no social learning and is Pareto-dominated by the low activity one. In the low activ-
ity equilibrium the informational beneﬁt of waiting is determined by the symmetric
investment probability λ∗. The higher λ∗, the less ”noise” (in the sense of Blackwell
(1951)) is added to the public signal, the higher the informational beneﬁt of waiting.
As usual, optimists choose λ∗ such that the informational beneﬁt of waiting is equal
to the cost of waiting.
It turns out that the low activity equilibrium is much more robust to the introduction
of cheap talk than the high activity one. This is because in the former equilibrium
both types share similar preferences in that they both want the optimists to randomise
3as much as possible, and therefore have an incentive to overreport their signals. De-
spite the fact that both types have similar preferences over the receiver’s actions a
separating equilibrium exists - for a certain range of parameter values - in the latter
equilibrium because there a pessimist wants to refrain the other pessimists from in-
vesting in order to learn something from the optimists’ investment actions.
We also introduce competition and positive network externalities in the model. In
the presence of competition eﬀects (or negative network externalities), the unique
equilibrium in the communication game is the ”babbling” one, i.e. no useful infor-
mation is transmitted via words. However we show that our truthtelling equilibrium
remains robust towards the introduction of positive network externalities. Moreover
in that case we also show that in a limited parameter range we get, under mild ad-
ditional assumptions, truthtelling as a unique equilibrium. This is due to our ﬁnding
that pessimists strictly prefer to reveal their good signal because otherwise they don’t
learn anything, optimists strictly prefer to reveal their good signal because they want
to be imitated. Finally we also introduce an opinion poll in CG’s model. Prior to
making their investment decisions J randomly drawn players are asked to report their
signals. If our players don’t know whether J is an even or an uneven number then for
the entire range of parameter values (and if players focus on the high activity equi-
librium (if it exists) in the continuation game) there exists a truthtelling equilibrium
(∀J ≥ 12).
This paper belongs to three diﬀerent strands of the literature: (i) the one which anal-
yses the consequences of cheap talk in models of social learning, (ii) the one which
analyses cheap talk in strategic contexts, and (iii) the one which introduces informa-
tion externalities in investment models.
(i) Cheap talk in models of social learning:
Gossner and Melissas (2006) study a similar game to ours. However, they did not
introduce competition eﬀects and positive network externalities in their model. Nor
did they tackle the case in which more than one player is being asked to divulge
her signal prior to the waiting game. Banerjee and Fudenberg (BF,1994) and Smith
and Sørensen (1997) are the ﬁrst models to analyse the eﬃciency of social learning
through costless communication2. In those models new agents must make a once-
and-for-all decision between two technologies, the payoﬀs of which are independent
of the technological choices of the other agents. Prior to making their investment
2In this line of research we also want to mention Banerjee’s (1993) paper on how rumours can
aﬀect economic behaviour.
4decision they ask a sample of incumbent agents which technology they use and how
satisﬁed they are with it. Since these incumbents themselves adopted their technology
after sampling other previous agents, one can think of their technological choice (and
their subsequent payoﬀs) as an imperfect signal concerning the proﬁtability of either
technology. BF’s results draws a less dark picture of social learning. In particular
they ﬁnd that if at least two other agents are sampled, asymptotically the domi-
nant technology will supersede the inferior one. Those papers assume that all players
truthfully report their signals. Given their exogenous queue framework it is quite
natural to focus on truthful revelation. Their context is most realistic if one considers
a consumer who asks to friends how happy they are with their brands. No doubt,
word-of-mouth communication is an important information channel in everyday life,
but it is by no means the only way through which cheap talk actually occurs in our
society. This paper analyses cheap talk in an endogenous queue setting. Hence we
do not take truthful communication for granted, instead its existence is endogenously
derived from utility maximising agents. As BF we also ﬁnd that costless communi-
cation improves matters in an endogenous queue setting provided that the investors
focus on the less eﬃcient equilibrium in the waiting game.
(ii) Cheap talk in strategic contexts:
As mentioned previously, in an abstract model of cheap talk Crawford and Sobel
(1982) showed that costless communication can be very informative. Subsequently a
number of papers appeared which analysed the existence of separating equilibria in
diﬀerent realistic contexts. For example, Mathews (1989) analyses how a Presidential
veto threat can credibly convey information concerning the President’s preferences to
the Congress, Stein’s (1989) model explains why imprecise policy announcements by
the FED can be informative. As in the previous papers, I also prove the existence of
a separating equilibrium. While cheap talk is informative in the previous papers due
to an exogenous preference reversal, in this paper separating equilibria are driven by
diﬀerent (endogenous) outside options of the diﬀerent players3.
To the best of our knowledge this is the ﬁrst paper which analyses what induces peo-
ple to truthfully reveal their opinion when thay are asked to do so in an opinion poll.
We show that the intuition why a player may want to truthfully reveal her opinion is
not altered much by the presence of many other players at the communication stage.
This is because in an opinion poll each player computes her best strategy under the
assumption that she is the pivotal player whose report will infuence decisively the
3For a model which analyses the role of mechanism design to implement truthtelling see Glazer
and Rubinstein (1997)
5behaviour of the remaining players. This insight is similar to the one obtained in vot-
ing models (see e.g. Rosenthal (1993)) where each person in an election votes in the
hope that her vote will overturn the election results. However in our set-up allowing
for many senders improves matters because it doubles the range of parameter values
in which a truthtelling equilibrium exists.
(iii) Information externalities in investment models:
CG argued that the aggregate investment level is, due to an information externality,
too low from a social welfare point of view. On the basis of their model, one would
want to subsidise investments to make the optimists invest more and increase the
amount of information released. However, Chamley (1997) has shown that the issue
is not so simple, because there exists another equilibrium in the waiting game which
generates too much investments and too little learning. In his model it is not clear
whether investments should be taxed or subsidised. This paper argues that not only
does cheap talk overcome possible overinvestment problems, moreover it yields more
information than the one which is released by having only optimists investing. Taxing
investments is thus deﬁnitely not a good idea. In contradiction with Chamley (1997),
CG is shown to be robust to the introduction of cheap talk. However this is also one
of its weaknesses because CG preclude the existence of opinion polls which is at odds
with what we observe in reality. This critique against CG and Chamley (1997) will
be taken up more in detail in our seventh section. Finally this paper also provides
a ﬁrst attempt to incorporate (positive as well as negative) network externalities in
CG’s model4.
This paper is organised as follows. In section two we present our two-stage com-
munication waiting game. In the third section we solve our waiting game in the
absence of any communication (this section merely represents a simpliﬁed version of
CG’s model). We explain that our waiting game can be characterised by multiple
equilibria. We next introduce costless communication in the picture and we show
that if our investors focus on the Pareto-dominated equilibrium in the waiting game,
one player (which we call player i) has much more incentives to truthfully reveal her
own signal. In section four we introduce competition eﬀects in the model. Positive
network externalities are introduced in the ﬁfth section. In section six we provide
the reader with some explanations concerning how to interpret player i. In section
seven we analyse the case of opinion polls. A truthtelling equilibrium exists then for
a much wider region of our exogenous variables. A discussion and ﬁnal comments are
4For a simple model with two players which combines network and information externalities see
Choi (1997).
6summarized in the seventh and ﬁnal section.
2 The model: the general framework
Assume we have a population of N risk neutral players who must decide whether
to invest in a risky project or not. The revenues of the investment project, V,
can take two values: V ∈ {1,0}. The cost of the investment project is denoted
by c. The state of the world is described by Θ ∈ {H,L}. if Θ = H the good
state prevails and V = 1. If Θ = L, the economy is in a bad state and V = 0
(P(Θ = H) = P(Θ = L) = P(H) = P(L) = 1
2). Each player possesses an imper-
fect private signal, si, concerning the realisation of Θ. si ∈ {h,l}, i = 1,...,N. If
Θ = H, NH individuals receive signal h. If Θ = L, NL individuals receive signal
h, and N − NL individuals receive signal l. We deﬁne p as
NH
N and we assume that
p > 1
2. For simplicity, we also assume that
NL
N = 1 − p. In this paper, unless stated
diﬀerently, we assume that:
A1: 1 − p < c < p
A1 implies that a player who received signal h is - a priori - willing to invest, be-
cause P(H|h) = p > c. Henceforth, we call a person having received at time
- 1 (see below) a good (bad) signal an optimist (pessimist). A player who re-
ceived a bad signal computes P(H|l) = 1 − p. As 1 − p < c, in the absence of
any other favourable news, pessimists abstain from investing. We also work un-
der the simplifying assumption that N is very large. Under this assumption the
P(si = h|sj = h,H) = P(si = h|H) = p,∀j 6= i (where j = 1,2,...,N). In other
words, if N is very large our model behaves as if signals were iid. Analysing our model
in the case of a large population seems natural, because in our set-up N represents f.i.
all the investors in the U.S.. In sections three, four and ﬁve we analyse the following
two-stage game:
-1) The state of nature is realised and our N players receive their signals,
0) One randomly drawn player is asked her signal. Her report is made public to all
N players,
1) All players make their investment decisions,
2) All players observe how many persons invested in period one, and those who haven’t
invested yet make their investment decisions. Payoﬀs are received and the game ends.
In section seven we consider the same game except that we will work under the
assumption that at time zero the number of interviewed players is uncertain and is
7greater or equal than two. In other words sections three, four and ﬁve analyse the
incentives of a single player while section seven analyses the case of an opinion poll.
As usual the equilibrium strategies are computed by backwards induction. Therefore
we ﬁrst focus on our waiting game, afterwards we analyse the equilibrium strategies
in the communication game.
3 Strategic waiting without network externalities.
In this section we skip time 0 in our game and we compute the equilibrium strategies
in our waiting game. λ ∈ [0,1] represents the strategy of an optimistic player, it
denotes the (symmetric) probability with which all optimistic players invest in the
ﬁrst period. Similarly, λp ∈ [0,1] represents the strategy of the pessimists, it denotes
the probability with which all pessimists invest in period one. Throughout the paper
endogenous variables and their equilibrium values are respectively denoted without
and with a *.
Assume that λ = 1 and that λp = 0. In this case all the optimists invest in period
one. In period two, the number of optimists (and thus the state of nature), becomes
common knowledge. We assume that:
A2: p − c < δp(1 − c)
A2 implies that if an optimist believes all the other optimists will invest in the ﬁrst
period, then it’s optimal for her to wait and to make her investment decision - based
on superior information - in the second period. Stated diﬀerently, A2 puts a lower
bound on the discount factor δ, such that there is a positive option value of waiting.
Call k (= 0,1,...,N) the number of players who invest in the ﬁrst period. P(H|si,k,
λ,λp) denotes player i’s second-period posterior probability that Θ = H given player
i’s signal si, given that k players invested in the ﬁrst period and given the investment
probabilities λ and λp. From now on, whenever P(·|·) does not explicitly contain λp as
an argument, this means that λp is supposed to equal zero. As information in our game
is incomplete, players’ beliefs about other players’ types must be speciﬁed as part of
the equilibrium. In this model beliefs about other players’ types ultimately matter
because the presence of relatively many optimists indicates that Θ = H. Therefore
we deﬁne our equilibrium concept using the probability assessment P(H|si,k,λ,λp)
instead of working with each players’ beliefs concerning the other players’ types. A
perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) is a (p,λ,λp) such that:
(i) no player can gain by choosing a diﬀerent strategy, given p and given that the
8other players invest at time one with probabilities λ and λp
(ii) whenever possible, P(H|si,k,λ,λp) is computed via Bayes’rule, given λ and λp.
The analysis of this waiting game is not original. A more general version of that
waiting game has already been analysed by CG and by Chamley (1997). CG showed
that the waiting game is characterised by a so-called low-activity equilibrium. In
that equilibrium λ∗
p = 0 and λ∗ ∈ (0,1). In subsequent work Chamley (1997) showed
that the waiting game may - provided that c ≤ 1 − p - also be characterised by
another symmetric equilibrium which he called the high activity equilibrium. In that
equilibrium λ∗
p = λ∗ = 1. We ﬁrst present the train of thought which underlies CG’s
analysis. Next we analyse Chamley’s high activity equilibrium.
3.1 The low activity equilibrium.
In this PBE λ∗
p = 0 and λ∗ ∈ (0,1). In this subsection we work under A1. Therefore
it’s a dominant strategy for each pessimist not to invest at time one and λ∗
p = 0.
However it can be shown that the analysis remains unaﬀected if c ≤ 1 − p.
We ﬁrst state our ﬁrst lemma which is very useful in computing the ex ante gain of
waiting of a player. In the lemma below k1, k2 = 0,1,...,NH − 1.
Lemma 1: P(H|si,k2,λ) > P(H|si,k1,λ), ∀k2 > k1, ∀si, ∀λ ∈ (0,1)
Proof: see appendix
Lemma one is very intuitive. Upon observing k investments, players compute their
posteriors P(H|si,k,λ). If k is high, then the other players conclude that probably
many players are optimistic and that therefore Θ = H. If an optimist waits, and
if the other optimists invest with a probability λ, then her ex post payoﬀ (discard-
ing discounting costs) equals: Max{0,P(H|h,k,λ) − c}. Her ex ante payoﬀ (net of




[P(H|h,k,λ) − c]P(k|h,λ) (1)
k = 0,1,....,NH−1 represents the lowest integer such that P(H|h,k,λ) ≥ c. If λ = 0,





where kp(= 1,2,...,NH) represents the lowest integer such that P(H|h,kp,λ) ≥ c,
9whenever kp exists5. Intuitively, k (kp) represents the minimal amount of information
that an optimist (pessimist) must get in the second period to make her willing to
invest given the symmetric investment probability λ. k and kp are increasing in λ:
observing f.i. 10 investments with a λ = 0.01 is better news than observing 10 invest-
ments with a λ = 0.5. Equation (1) represents thus one equation in two unknowns:
λ and k.
The higher λ the more precise an idea one can get about the number of optimists in
the world and the higher the ex ante gain of waiting. This can best be understood
by comparing player i’s incentive to wait if λ were equal to zero to the one he faces
if λ were equal to one. If λ = 0, then there cannot be any gain of waiting. For if an
optimist were to wait, she wouldn’t observe any ﬁrst-period investment, she would
compute P(H|h,k = 0,λ = 0) = p and would have the same incentives to invest at
time two as the ones she had at time one. On the other hand, if λ = 1 then there is a
high gain of waiting. In that case the state of the world is perfectly revealed at time
two and player i can make a riskless second-period investment decision. Therefore
W(·,λ) is strictly increasing in λ6 7. We know enough to state:
Theorem 1 (Chamley and Gale (1994)) There exists a unique low activity equilib-
rium.
Proof: In equilibrium the gain of waiting must be equal to the gain of investing, i.e.
p − c = δW(h,λ∗). By continuity, if λ = 0, δW(h,0) = δ[p − c] < p − c. If λ = 1, by
A2 δW(h,1) > p − c. Therefore there exists a unique symmetric PBE8. Q.E.D.
Note that the welfare consequences of this waiting game are drastic: in equilibrium
there are no gains from information revelation! Indeed, as in equilibrium the (dis-
counting) cost of waiting equals the (informational) beneﬁt of waiting, optimists are
indiﬀerent between the two strategies and therefore the possibility of waiting does not
aﬀect their welfare. Pessimists beneﬁt from the possibility of waiting because they
can free-ride on the informational value of the ﬁrst period investment decisions of the
5If λ = 0 (and hence k = 0) then a pessimist computes P(H|l,0,0) = 1 − p < c and kp doesn’t
exist. In all the cases where kp doesn’t exist, we assume that W(l,0) = 0.
6For a more technical intuition, based on Blackwell’s (1951) value of information theorem, why
W(·,λ) is strictly increasing in λ see CG.
7W(h,λ) is continuous in λ because once k is ﬁxed p(1−c)b(k;NH −1,λ)+(1−p)cb(k;NL−1,λ)
is continuous in λ and because at the probability λk where k increases, the expected gain of investing
equals zero. The same reasoning also applies to W(l,λ).
8We computed λ∗ under the assumption that players can only invest in two periods. As shown
in CG this is without loss of generality. Indeed, they have shown that in equilibrium having the
possibility to wait only one period or to wait an inﬁnite number of periods leaves the equilibrium
strategies unaﬀected. They coined this insight as the one-step property.
10optimists. In this equilibrium the social returns to ﬁrst-period investments exceed
the private ones due to an information externality. Therefore a social planner will
always implement a higher investment probability. Actually any probability higher
than λ∗ increases welfare in this model, because the investors get p − c, and the
players who wait receive a more informative signal. On the basis of this model one
would want to subsidise investments to induce investors to generate more information.
The lemma below will be very useful in the analysis of the equilibrium strategies in
our communication game:
lemma 2: if δ < 1, whenever λ∗
p = 0, λ∗ is a strictly increasing function of p.
Proof: see appendix
More optimistic players face a higher gain of investing and are only indiﬀerent if the
gain of waiting also increases (and this only happens when λ∗ increases).
3.2 High Activity Equilibrium.
As shown by Chamley (1997) if c ≤ 1 − p there also exists one (and only one)
other symmetric PBE, which he called the high activity equilibrium. In that equi-
librium no one randomises and optimists as well as pessimists invest in the ﬁrst
period (i.e. λ∗ = λ∗
p = 1). To see that this constitutes an equilibrium, assume
that player i is a pessimist and suppose he were to deviate by not investing at
time one. At time two, he would observe N − 1 investments and he would com-
pute P(H|l,k = N − 1,λ = 1,λp = 1). This latter probability equals P(H|l). This
is logical: in the high activity equilibrium player i - independently of the realised
state of the world - always observes N − 1 investments. As player i cannot infer the
number of optimists out of these N −1 investments, his prior remains unaﬀected and
in the second period player i gets δ(P(H|l)−c). Hence, due to discounting, if player
i expects that λ = λp = 1, he strictly prefers to invest as well in the ﬁrst period (in
which case he gets 1 − p − c ≥ 0).
The low activity equilibrium entails a lot of social learning and Pareto-dominates the
high activity equilibrium. In the high activity equilibrium too little learning occurs
due to too high an investment level. Therefore in this case one would want to tax
investments.
For our purpose this issue of multiple equilibria is an important one. Even if 1−p < c,
it is possible that - after the communication stage - pessimists become optimistic
enough and face a positive gain of investing. We will see that the equilibrium strategy
11in the communication game depends strongly on which equilibrium will be selected in
the subsequent waiting game. If our players expect the high activity equilibrium to be
selected, then a separating equilibrium is more likely to happen in the communication
game. In other words this paper shows that the low activity equilibrium is more robust
to the introduction of cheap talk than the high activity one.
3.3 Strategic information transmission by one player without
network externalities.
We now focus on the communication game. We analyse the case where one randomly
chosen player (henceforth player i) is asked her opinion concerning the state of the
world by the media. We analyse her incentives to truthfully reveal her signal given
that she is also uncertain concerning the realised state of the world and given that
she also wants to learn about the other’s signals.
3.3.1 Some deﬁnitions
We assume that the reported signal ˆ si ∈ {h,l}. Call x the strategy of an optimistic
player, it represents the probability with which an optimist truthfully reports her good
signal. y represents the strategy of a pessimistic player. It denotes the probability
with which she strategically reports a good signal (even though she’s a pessimist). A
probability assessment β for player j is deﬁned as a function β : [0,1]2×{h,l}2 → [0,1]
with the interpretation that β(x,y,sj, ˆ si) = P(H|sj, ˆ si,x,y). A perfect Bayesian equi-
librium (in our communication game) is a (x,y,β)9 such that:
(i) player i cannot achieve a strictly higher payoﬀ by choosing a diﬀerent x or y, given
β and given that (β,λ,λp) must form a PBE in the continuation game,
(ii) whenever possible, β must be computed via Bayes’ rule, given x and y.
λo denotes the equilibrium strategy of the optimists in the waiting game if they pos-
sess one good and one bad signal and if λp = 0. λo denotes the equilibrium strategy of
the optimists in the waiting game if they possess two favourable signals and if λp = 0.
As before λ∗ denotes the equilibrium strategy of the optimists if they don’t possess
any additional information (besides their own signals)10 and if λp = 0.
Deﬁnition: A communication strategy is called informative if P(H|si, ˆ si,x,y) 6=
P(H|si). A communication strategy is a truthtelling one whenever x =
9For the same reason as the one we mentioned before, we deﬁne our equilibrium concept using a
probability assessment β instead of explicitly incorporating the players’ beliefs concerning the other
players’ types into the deﬁnition.
10Even though λo and λo denote equilibrium probabilities, to economise on notation, we omit the
* superscript.
121 and y = 0.
In other words a strategy is informative as soon as x 6= y. If x = y, then com-
munication does not aﬀect the players’ posterior beliefs. This case corresponds to a
pooling equilibrium in the communication game. P(·|sj, ˆ si = ·) denotes the posterior
probability that Θ = ·, given player j’s signal, given that player i reported ˆ si = ·, and
given that player j revises his posterior under the assumption that player i truthfully
reported her signal.
The bulk of this paper is devoted to proving the existence of a truthtelling equilibrium
in the communication game. However, we will see that if positive network externalities
are added to the model, we will obtain - in a certain parameter range - truthtelling as
a unique equilibrium. Therefore we shall also use the following equilibrium reﬁnement:
Equilibrium reﬁnement (ER):11 If player i reports a signal which she was supposed
never to send, and if there exists one (and only one) type of player for which the







p)} ≤ Max{A(·,λ,λp),δW(·,λ,λp)} ∀λ,λp ∈ [0,1]
(where A(·,λ∗,λ∗
p) represents the ex ante payoﬀ of investing in the ﬁrst period when
player i’s signal equals ·, and when optimists (pessimists) invest in period one with
the equilibrium probabilities λ∗ (λ∗
p) given that no out-of-equilibrium information set
was reached), then all players believe with probability one that player i’s type is the
one which respects the inequality above.
3.3.2 Strategic communication when players focus on the high activity
equilibrium (if it exists) in the continuation game.
This case was already studied by Gossner and Melissas (2006). In particular they
showed that:
Proposition 1 (Gossner and Melissas (2006))If players focus on the high activity
equilibrium (if it exists) in the continuation game and if c ∈ (1 − p, 1
2] there exists a
truthtelling equilibrium.
Proposition (1) is not trivial! Both sender’s types share the same preferences over the
receivers’ actions in the sense that both of them want the optimists to invest more
and the pessimists to remain quiet. Therefore one would expect that all equilibrium
11Note that this equilibrium reﬁnement represents a very weak restriction. It is similar (but
nonetheless diﬀerent) to Cho and Kreps’ (1987) intuitive criterion.
13communication strategies be uninformative. For example, both in Stein’s (1989) anal-
ysis of cheap talk by the FED and Mathews’ (1989) analysis of a veto threat by a
president12, the existence of informative equilibria was driven by an exogenous pref-
erence reversal, i.e. diﬀerent sender’s types prefer diﬀerent receiver’s actions. In this
paper a pessimist ultimately ”prefers” to report l to h, not because of an exoge-
nous preference reversal, but because both types are endowed with diﬀerent outside
options13. The outside option of a pessimist equals zero. A pessimist wants to avoid
that the other pessimists destroy all informational gains from waiting and therefore
truthfully reports her unfavourable signal. The outside option of the optimist equals
p − c. As explained above, given this high outside option she cannot discriminate
between the two strategies. Ideally she wants to report a bad signal to the pessimists
and a good one to the optimists, but this is impossible. Therefore she’s unable to
achieve any higher utility level and is indiﬀerent.
Proposition (1) highlights under which assumptions a truthtelling equilibrium exists.
Of course it’s not the unique informative equilibrium. One can ﬁnd other informative
equilibria in which x∗ 6= 1 and y∗ = 0. However, we don’t want to enter into a detailed
analysis of these semi seperating-pooling equilibria because none of these equilibria
are robust towards the introduction of network externalities (see below).
4 Competition eﬀects: the case of a ﬁrst-mover
advantage.
In this section we assume that our technology is characterised by negative network
externalities and we analyse its consequence(s) on proposition (1). Introducing (pos-
itive as well as negative) network externalities in CG’s framework constitutes a hard
job. In this section, to simplify matters we work under the following speciﬁc assump-
tion:
A3: If an investor is the ﬁrst and the only one to invest in any of the two periods
then she gets γ > 1 (if Θ = H), independently of how many persons invest in the
(eventual) next period.
A3 states that if an optimist is the only one to invest in period one then, indepen-
12In Mathews’ paper an extremist president would not threaten to veto a large defence budget
because if the congress responds to that threat by reducing the defence budget, he would (by
assumption) be worse oﬀ.
13with this we mean the utility level obtained by a player if she doesn’t receive any additional
information.
14dently of how many persons invest in the second period, she will get γ (if Θ = H).
However if at least one other player also invests in period one, they both get 1 (if
Θ = H). The same is true for second period investments except that a lonesome
period two investor can never be imitated. There are two ways to interpret A3. First
A3 can be interpreted as a typical ﬁrst mover advantage, f.i. the ﬁrst ﬁrm to enter
into a market may beneﬁt from some ”brand name”, or from temporary monopoly
proﬁts,... . Second, there also exists another way to interpret A3 which captures
what one would call negative network externalities. Suppose that the investment
yields a return of γ > 1 if only one ﬁrm invests (and if Θ = H) and a return equal
to one as soon as two ﬁrms invest (independently of when the second player invests).
Suppose λ∗ is chosen such that P(H|h,k = 1,λ∗) < c. Under these assumptions if in
period one only one ﬁrm invests then that ﬁrm gets γ if Θ = H because no manager
will be willing to invest in period two. So our assumption that a lonesome period
one investor’s payoﬀ remains unaﬀected by subsequent investments is without loss of
generality as long as k
∗ ≥ 2.
A(h,λ) denotes the gain of investing in period one if sj = h, if λp = 0 and if the
other optimists invest with probability λ at time one. We also simplify the model
by assuming that δ → 1. Note that A(h,λ) ≥ p − c ∀λ. This is because if a player
decides to invest in period one, he may end up being the only to have invested at
time one in which case he gets γ instead of 1 (if Θ = H).
In the appendix we prove that if time zero is omitted from our game, (i) if c > 1−p,
there exists a unique low activity equilibrium and (ii) if c ≤ 1 − p there also exists
one (and only one) other symmetric equilibrium where λ∗
p = λ∗ = 1. We also show
that lemma 2 remains valid under A3.
Proposition (2) summarises the equilibrium communication strategies.
Proposition 2 Under A1, A3, ∀γ > 1, independently of the chosen equilibrium
in the continuation game, the unique equilibrium in the communication game is the
babbling one.
Proof (and intuition): We do not provide a proof of the equilibrium communication
strategy if all players focus on the low activity equilibrium in the continuation game,
nor do we prove the inexistence of informative communication strategies when c > 1
2
and when players focus on the high activity equilibrium (if it exists) in the contin-
uation game, because the proof parallels the one we developed for proposition (1).
Intuitively, in both cases an informative communication strategy fails to exist in equi-
librium because - as in our previous case without network externalities - a pessimist
wants to pretend to be an optimist to increase the period-one symmetric investment
15probability λ∗. Moreover in this case - depending on the values of the parameters -
even an optimist may not (not even partially) want to reveal her type because, with
a ﬁrst mover advantage, she may want to pretend to be a pessimist in the (vain) hope
to decrease λ∗, and thus to increase her probability to be the only one to invest at
time one14.
More interestingly, assume that c ≤ 1
2, that all players revise their priors under the
assumption that player i truthfully reveals her type, and that player i is an opti-
mist. If she reports ˆ si = h then everyone (optimists as well as pessimists) invest
and she gets p − c. However she can do better because by reporting ˆ si = l she gets
A(h,λo) > p − c. Hence a truthtelling equilibrium does not exist because - even
though a pessimist prefers to report her unfavourable signal - an optimist has an
incentive to deviate. As previously one can easily show that there exists no other
informative equilibrium in this context.Q.E.D.
Note that proposition (2) is true as soon as γ > 1. In other words even if the technol-
ogy is characterised by very small negative network externalities no communication
will ever take place15
5 Positive network externalities.
In this section we introduce positive network externalities in CG’s model of social
learning. We work under the following technological assumption:
A3’: The investment generates a revenue equal to 1 if Θ = H and if at least two
players invested. If only one player invests then the investment generates a revenue
equal to γ < 1 (where γ → 1) if Θ = H.
Note that in this case A(h,λ) ≤ p − c. This is because if an optimist invests at time
one she may end up being the only one to have done so. In that case she gets γ
instead of one (if Θ = 1). In these paragraphs we do not give a detailed analysis of
14A formal proof is left to the reader as an exercise.
15Of course we do not look at the issue of report-contingent transfers. Apart from the fact that
we do not observe them in practice they raise two theoretical objections. First there does not
always exist a report-contingent transfer which implements the truthtelling equilibrium because the
transfer may be higher than W(l,λo) (meaning that the pessimist will prefer to report a high signal
and pocket the transfer). Second if γ would depend on a ﬁrm-speciﬁc variable and each ﬁrm has
some private information concerning its height, it’s not clear how high the side transfer must be. In
that case bargaining under asymmetric information yields ineﬃciencies which increases the cost of
the side transfer.
16the equilibrium behaviour in our waiting game (i.e. in the absence of time zero in
our game)16. We just want to mention that under A3’ the existence of a low activity
equilibrium is not always guaranteed. However, if γ → 1, (i) there almost always
exists a low activity equilibrium and (ii) if a low activity equilibrium exists, all our
previous insights remain unchanged. The intuition is simple: as γ → 1, this model is
almost identical to our benchmark case and all our previous results remain unchanged
(see the appendix for a more complete and more formal exposition).
Before turning to the analysis of equilibrium communication strategies we assume
that λ∗, λo and λo exist (which is quite natural as, once p and c are ﬁxed, and, as
γ → 1, there almost always exists a unique low activity equilibrium). As before if
all players focus on the low activity equilibrium in the continuation game, then an
informative strategy doesn’t exist in equilibrium because a pessimist wants to pretend
to be an optimist to learn more.
More interestingly, assume that investors focus on the high activity equilibrium (if
it exists) in the continuation game, assume that all players compute β(·) under the
assumption that x = 1 and y = 0 and assume that c ≤ 1
2. We ﬁrst consider the case
of a pessimistic player. If she reports ˆ si = l, she gets δW(l,λo). Since 0 ≤ δW(l,λo),
a pessimist has no incentive to deviate. Assume player i is an optimist. If she reports
ˆ si = l, she gets A(h,λ0) ≤ p−c. If she reports ˆ si = h, then - since c ≤ 1
2 and since we
focus on the high activity equilibrium - everybody invests and she gets p − c. Hence
in this case a truthtelling equilibrium exists.
Note that with positive network externalities if posteriors are computed under the
assumption that player i truthfully reports her opinion, then an optimist may strictly
prefers to report her favourable signal because she wants to be imitated. A pessimist
also strictly prefers to report her unfavourable signal because she wants to learn about
the others’ signals. This ﬁnding that both types may strictly prefer to reveal their
signals is not without any consequence. We can show that if c ∈ (
(1−p)2
(1−p)2+p2,1 − p]
and under some very weak additional assumptions that the unique equilibrium of the
communication game is the truthtelling one. Our main results are summarised below.
Proposition 3 If investors focus on the high activity equilibrium (if it exists) in the
continuation game:
(i) if c ∈ (1 − p, 1
2], there exists a truthtelling equilibrium,
16This is a paper about cheap talk in an investment model with information externalities. We
introduced positive and negative network externalities in our benchmark model because we were in
the ﬁrst place interested to check the robustness of proposition (1). In this and the previous section
we do not want to make a complete analysis of all equilibria in a waiting game with information and
network externalities.
17(ii) if c ∈ (
(1−p)2
(1−p)2+p2,1 − p], if there exists a probability 0 > 0 that posteriors will
be computed under the assumption that x = 1 and y = 0 and under ER, the unique
equilibrium of our communication game is the truthtelling one.
Proof: the proof of point (i) appears above, the proof of point (ii) appears in the
appendix
The intuition behind point (ii) is the following one. Assume it is common knowledge
that with a probability (1 − 0) posteriors will be computed at time one under the
assumption that x = y. In that case both types are indiﬀerent between reporting the
two signals. However if there exists an arbitrarily small probability that all players
will compute their posteriors under the assumption that x = 1 and y = 0 then
both types are not indiﬀerent anymore and strictly prefer to report their types17. If
posteriors are computed under the assumption that x = y = 1 then a pessimist will
strictly prefer to report her low signal because she knows that under ER, she will be
credibly believed and this will discourage the other pessimists from investing.
6 Opinion Polls.
So far we only worked with one player in the communication game. In this section we
analyse what happens if many players are simultaneously asked to report their sig-
nals. In proposition (1) and proposition (3) we showed that a truthtelling equilibrium
exists if all players focus on the high activity equilibrium (if it exists) in the continu-
ation game and if c ≤ 1
2. One may ﬁnd this parameter range quite small. However,
in this section we will see that if more than twelve players are simultaneously ”inter-
viewed”, if our players don’t know whether the number of interviewed players is even
or uneven, and if our players focus on the high activity equilibrium (if it exists) in the
continuation game, a truthtelling equilibrium exists for the whole parameter range
c ∈ (1 − p,p). Unfortunately, but not unexpectedly, it was impossible to prove that
result analytically. Instead we derived it using numerical computations. This section
only focuses on the high activity equilibrium. In the light of our previous results this
is logical because if players focus on the low activity equilibrium in the continuation
game pessimists always wait, both types send as high a signal as possible and there-
fore all cheap talk is fully uninformative. There is no reason to suppose that this
equilibrium behaviour would be aﬀected by the mere presence of many players in the
communication game. Finally, we assume that our technology is not characterised by
any type of network externalities.
17Similarly, one can show that if c ∈ (1−p, 1
2] and if with a probability 0 posteriors are computed
under the assumption that x = 1, y = 0, then no semi separating-pooling equilibrium exists in our
communication game.
186.1 Some deﬁnitions.
We consider the same game as before except that at time zero J players are simulta-
neously asked to report their signals (J = 2,3,....,J) (J < NL). ˆ s−i denotes a vector
(1x(J − 1)) of the reported signals of the other players present in the opinion poll. ˆ s
denotes a vector (1xJ) containing the reports of the J players present in the opinion
poll.
To ﬁx ideas, suppose that J = 4. If ˆ s−i = [h h h] this means that the three other
players present in the opinion poll reported good signals. If ˆ s−i = [h h l], this means
that two out of the three other players present in the opinion poll reported signal h.
From basic statistical textbooks we know that, if signals are identically and indepen-
dently distributed, good signals inside ˆ s−i cancel out bad ones. This insight allows us
to simplify much the analysis of an opinion poll. To understand our train of thought,
consider the following two conﬁgurations of ˆ s−i (in the ﬁrst one J is assumed to equal
four, in the second example J = 2): ˆ s−i = [h h l] and ˆ s−i = [h]. Our statistical prop-
erty then implies that P(·|ˆ si, ˆ s−i = [h h l]) = P(·|ˆ si, ˆ s−i = [h]). In words, receiving
two good and one bad signal is, statistically speaking, identical to receiving only one
good signal.
This statistical property allows us to simplify our notations. ˆ sa
−i = m h (m l) (where
m = 0,1,....,J +1) denotes the aggregate informational value of ˆ sa
−i. Call n the num-
ber which is obtained after subtracting the number of bad signals from the number
of good ones (contained in ˆ s−i). If n < 0, then we denote the aggregate informational
value of ˆ s−i by |n| l. If n ≥ 0, then we denote the aggregate informational value of
ˆ s−i by n h. Similarly ˆ sa denotes the aggregate informational value contained in ˆ s.
That value is computed in the same way the one we explained for ˆ s−i.
Note that, if J = 4, ˆ sa
−i can only take four values: 3h,1h,1l and 3l. ˆ sa
−i cannot take
the value 2h for example because in our example J − 1 is uneven. For example if J
equalled ﬁve, then J − 1 would be an even number and ˆ sa
−i could take the values:
4h,2h,0h,2l and 4l. As we will see this insight is not without any importance18.
δW(ml,λ) (δW(mh,λ)) denotes the ex ante gain of waiting given that ˆ sa = m l (m h)
and given that the other optimists randomise with probability λ. We ﬁrst analyse the
case where c ∈ (1 − p, 1
2]. In our next subsection we analyse the other case, namely
the one where c ∈ (1
2,p). In these pages, we also restrict ourselves in proving the
18We still work under the assumption that P(si = h|sa
−i = J − 1h,H) = p. Hence the reader
should bear in mind that implicitly our analysis rests on the assumption that J is ”small” relatively
to N.
19existence of a truthtelling equilibrium (we do not bother about the existence of other
more complicated informative equilibria).
6.2 Strategic information transmission in opinion polls with
a low investment cost.
Suppose that c ∈ (1 − p, 1
2]. Suppose that player i is a pessimist and that her signal
is asked by a polling agency. We ﬁrst analyse the case where J is an even number
afterwards we consider the opposite case.
6.2.1 J is even.
First, it is important to note that in the vast majority of conﬁgurations of ˆ sa
−i player
i is indiﬀerent between reporting h or reporting l. To see this suppose that J = 10.
Suppose that ˆ sa
−i = 9h. In that case our player is indiﬀerent between the two strate-
gies, because - independently of her report - the remaining pessimists received too
much positive news and invest in the ﬁrst period. The same can be said of the conﬁgu-
rations ˆ sa
−i = 7h, ˆ sa
−i = 5h, ˆ sa
−i = 3h. In all these conﬁgurations all players (optimists
as well as pessimists) - independently of player i’s report - end up investing after the
result of the opinion poll was made public to the other players. Idem if ˆ sa
−i = 9l, i.e.
if the nine other players present in the opinion poll are pessimists, - independently of
player i’s report - no one invests in the ﬁrst period because they were all overwhelmed
by too much bad news. The same happens in the conﬁgurations ˆ sa




Assume that ˆ sa
−i = 1h, which means that ﬁve out of the nine other players present
in the opinion poll are optimists. In that conﬁguration player i is not indiﬀerent
between the two pure strategies. If she reports ˆ si = h, then ˆ sa = 2h and, after
the announcement of the result of the opinion poll, pessimists compute P(H|l, ˆ sa =
2h) = p > c and they all invest in the ﬁrst period. Player i computes her posterior
P(H|l, ˆ sa
−i = 1h) = 1
2. Since 1
2 > c she also invests in period one and ex ante she
gets: 1
2 − c. However she can achieve a higher payoﬀ by truthfully revealing her bad
signal, because in that case ˆ sa = 0h (as the ﬁve good signals cancel out the ﬁve bad
ones the opinion poll contains no valuable information) and the players’ posteriors
remain unaﬀected. Hence pessimists do not invest in period one. Player i computes
her posterior P(H|l, ˆ sa
−i = 1h) = 1
2. Given that more optimistic players randomise
it’s optimal for her to wait and she gets δW(0h,λ∗) > 1
2 − c. So if ˆ sa
−i = 1h, the
truthtelling strategy yields a payoﬀ δW(0h,λ∗)−(1
2−c) higher than the lying strategy.
Assume now that ˆ sa
−i = 1l. In this case a pessimist rather reports a high signal.
20Suppose that ˆ si = l. The informativeness of the opinion poll now equals two bad
signals, ˆ sa = 2l. Optimists compute P(H|h, ˆ sa = 2l) = 1 − p < c and no one invests
in period one. Player i computes P(H|l, ˆ sa
−i = 1l). Since P(H|l, ˆ sa
−i = 1l) < 1−p < c,
she doesn’t invest either and she gets zero. However strategic lying yields now a higher
payoﬀ. Suppose that ˆ si = h. In that case the opinion poll is fully uninformative,
ˆ sa = 0h, pessimists wait, optimists randomise with a probability λ∗ and player i gets
δW(2l,λ∗) > 0. To summarise a pessimistic player only truthfully reports her bad











6.2.2 J is uneven.
In these paragraphs we assume that J is an uneven number. To illustrate what
changes if J is uneven, suppose that J equals eleven. Then J − 1 equals 10. As pre-
viously ˆ sa
−i can take many conﬁgurations, but only a few of them are worth studying.
For example ˆ sa
−i = 10h, ˆ sa
−i = 8h, ˆ sa
−i = 6h, ˆ sa
−i = 4h and ˆ sa
−i = 2h are no interesting
cases because - independently of player i’s report - everyone invests in the ﬁrst period.
The only interesting conﬁgurations, if J is uneven, are the ones where ˆ sa
−i = 0h and
ˆ sa
−i = 2l.
Suppose ﬁrst that ˆ sa
−i = 0h. Suppose our pessimistic player reports ˆ si = h, In
that event ˆ sa = 1h, pessimists compute P(H|l, ˆ sa = 1h) = 1
2 > c and everyone
invests in period one. Player i computes P(H|l, ˆ sa = 0h) = 1 − p < c and does
not invest. Therefore she gets zero. Suppose she reports ˆ si = l. Then the value of
the opinion poll’s aggregate information equals one bad signal. Optimists compute
P(H|h, ˆ sa = 1l) = 1
2 > c. Pessimists become, after hearing the result of the opinion
poll, even more pessimistic than they already were and don’t invest in period one.
Optimists now face a lower gain of acting and randomise with a probability λo < λ∗.
To summarise: if ˆ sa
−i = 0h, player i prefers to truthfully report her low signal because
then she gets a payoﬀ equal to δW(l,λo) > 0.
Assume now that ˆ sa
−i = 2l. In this conﬁguration our player rather reports a high
signal. If she truthfully reports her bad signal, then everyone is overwhelmed by too
much bad news and no one invests. If she strategically lies, she reduces the amount
of bad news contained in the opinion poll and this will induce some optimists to
invest and to produce information externalities. More formally, if ˆ si = h, ˆ sa = 1l and
optimists randomise with probability λo. Player i possesses now three bad signals.
Therefore , if ˆ sa
−i = 2l, the lying strategy yields her a payoﬀ of δW(3l,λo) > 0. To




−i = 0h|l,J)δW(l,λo) > p(ˆ s
a
−i = 2l|l,J)δW(3l,λo)
6.2.3 Uncertainty concerning the number of sampled players.
So far we assumed that all players knew how many players were ”interviewed” in
the opinion poll. This assumption is not a very realistic one. In many contexts
the interviewed players have no precise idea concerning the number of interviewed
players. Even marketing agencies which organise opinion polls don’t know how many
persons will return them their questionnaires. We introduce this kind of uncertainty
because we do not want our results to hinge on J being even or uneven. Moreover
if J is even we do not get the existence of a truthtelling equilibrium for our entire
parameter range. In this section we analyse numerically the incentives player i faces if
she’s uncertain whether J is an even or an uneven number. Without loss of generality
assume that J is an even number and assume that it is commonly known that, with
equal probability, J or J + 1 players are present in the opinion poll. From what we



















−i = 0h|l,J + 1)δW(l,λo) − p(ˆ s
a
−i = 2l|l,J + 1)δW(3l,λo) > 0 (2)



















−i = 2l|l,J + 1)
P(ˆ sa
−i = 1h|l,J)
δW(3l,λo) > 0 (3)
The lhs of this last inequality was computed for a wide range of parameter values
(remind that we still work under the assumption that c ∈ (1−p, 1
2]). In appendix two
a numerical example is detailed where our way of working is explained to the reader.
The numerical computations were performed with the aid of a little program which
runs in MATLAB which computes the equilibrium strategy of the optimists and the
ex ante gain of waiting of player i19. The results are shown below:
[Insert here Table One]
19The program is not provided in this paper but can be obtained from the author by simple
request.
22We see that, for all our numerical computations, a pessimistic player prefers to adopt
the truthtelling strategy to the lying one.
To understand the intuition of this result it is useful to go back to equation (2).
Suppose that J players are interviewed. First note that δW(2l,λ∗) represents the
cost of wrongly reporting l (i.e. reporting l if ˆ sa
−i = 1l). This cost is quite low
because if ˆ sa
−i = 1l, player i is already very pessimistic and doesn’t expect to
learn much out of the waiting game. δW(0h,λ∗) − (1
2 − c) represents the gain of
rightly reporting l (i.e. reporting l if ˆ sa
−i = 1h). This gain is often quite sub-
stantial because if ˆ sa
−i = 1h, our (former) pessimist expects to hear with proba-
bility 1




2 − c)] − P(ˆ sa
−i = 1l|l,J)δW(2l,λ∗)] is a positive number.
In the other 20% of our simulations, c is relatively low (close to 1 − p), therefore
(1
2 − c) is relatively high and the gain of rightly reporting l quite low. Suppose now
that J is uneven. As before δW(l,λo) represents the gain of rightly reporting l and
δW(3l,λo) represents the cost of wrongly reporting l. In all our numerical simula-
tions P(ˆ sa
−i = 0h|l,J +1)δW(l,λo)−p(ˆ sa
−i = 2l|l,J +1)δW(3l,λo) is strictly positive,
thereby compensating the eventual negative gain of reporting l to h in the event when
J is even.
Table one merely shows that if a pessimist believes that the other players will truth-
fully reveal their signals, it will be optimal for her to do so too. We still must check
whether an optimist - knowing that all the other players will truthfully reveal their
signals - doesn’t have an incentive to deviate. As previously the reader can easily
check that for many conﬁgurations of ˆ sa
−i an optimistic player is indiﬀerent between
her two pure strategies. Therefore we directly focus on the same cases as the ones we
analysed when player i was a pessimist.
First assume that ˆ sa
−i = 1h. If she reports ˆ si = h, pessimists possess too many posi-
tive signals, everyone invests in the ﬁrst period and our player gets P(H|2h) − c. If
she reports a low signal then pessimists wait and optimists randomise with probabil-
ity λ∗. However our player possesses two positive signals and is more optimistic than
the remaining optimists (who are indiﬀerent between investing and waiting). From
lemma 2, we know that she cannot be indiﬀerent between reporting h or l, instead
she rather invests in the ﬁrst period and gets P(H|2h) − c. So if ˆ sa
−i = 1h she is
indiﬀerent between reporting a favourable or an unfavourable signal. Next assume
that ˆ sa
−i = 0h. If ˆ si = h, then ˆ sa = 1h and everyone (pessimists as well as optimists)
invest in the ﬁrst period. Player i remains (of course) an optimist, therefore she also
invests in period one and she gets p − c. If she were to report a low signal, then
23λp = 0 and optimists randomise with a probability λo. However our player remains
an optimist and she rather acts immediately in period one and she gets p−c. Hence
if ˆ sa
−i = 0h an optimistic player is also indiﬀerent between her two pure strategies.
Suppose now that ˆ sa
−i = 1l. If she also reports a bad signal, then optimists possess
two bad signals along with their good one and don’t want to invest anymore. How-
ever player i’s posterior equals 1
2 (since she only possesses one bad piece of evidence
against her good one). Therefore she invests and gets (in expected terms) 1
2 − c.
If she reports her good signal, then the opinion poll is uninformative and optimists
randomise with a probability λ∗. In this case she waits and gets δW(0h,λ∗) > 1
2 −c.
Finally we consider the case where ˆ sa
−i = 2l. In this case an optimist also strictly
prefers to report her favourable signal because then she gets δW(l,λo) which is higher
than zero. So if many players are simultaneously ”interviewed” in the communica-
tion game an optimist strictly prefers to report her good signal. It’s interesting to
compare this ﬁnding with the one we obtained with only one interviewed guru. In
that case the optimist was indiﬀerent between ˆ sg = h and ˆ sg = l. The intuition
is similar as the one we explained previously and is also based on the insight that
the diﬀerent players possess diﬀerent outside options. For example, if ˆ sa
−i = 1h, our
player can (just as in the previous case) strategically lie to discourage the pessimists
from investing. However this would lead the other optimists to randomise with too
low an investment probability. If ˆ sa
−i = 1l, pessimists - independently of player i’s
report - don’t want to invest anyway. In such a case, player i’s outside option is
lower than the one of the other optimists. Since she doesn’t have to bother about
the pessimists’ actions, she rather reports h to l to let the other optimists invest more.
So far we have shown that, if it is as likely that J is an even or an uneven number
a truthtelling equilibrium exists if c ∈ (1 − p, 1
2]. This result shows that proposi-
tion (1) and proposition (3) are robust to the introduction of many players at the
communication stage.
6.3 Strategic information transmission in opinion polls with
a high investment cost.
In this section we work under the assumption that c ∈ (1
2,p). We will see that - in con-
trast to our previous case where only one player was considered in the communication
game - a truthtelling equilibrium also exists in this parameter range.
246.3.1 J is even.
As before for many conﬁgurations of ˆ sa
−i player i will be indiﬀerent between her two
pure strategies. Player i will not be indiﬀerent between her two pure strategies if
ˆ sa
−i = 1h or if ˆ sa
−i = 1l.
Assume that ˆ sa
−i = 1h. Assume that player i strategically lies and reports a high sig-
nal. The opinion poll contains then two good signals. Pessimists compute P(H|l, ˆ sa =
2h) = p > c and everyone invests in period one. Player i computes P(H|l, ˆ sa
−i = 1h) =
1
2. Since 1
2 is lower than c, our player does not invest and she gets zero. Assume now
that our player truthfully reports her low signal. In that case the opinion poll is
uninformative, ˆ sa = 0h, our players’ posteriors are not aﬀected, optimists randomise
with a probability λ∗ and player i gets δW(0h,λ∗) > 0.
Suppose now that ˆ sa
−i = 1l. If ˆ si = l, the opinion poll contains two bad signals,
optimists compute P(H|l, ˆ sa = 2l) = 1 − p < c and don’t invest. Hence player i gets
zero. Suppose she reports ˆ si = h. In that case ˆ sa = 0h and optimists randomise with
probability λ∗. Player i now possesses two unfavourable signals and ex ante she gets
δW(2l,λ∗) > 0. To summarise if J is even and if c ∈ (1
2,p) our player only truthfully








6.3.2 J is uneven
In this case only the conﬁgurations ˆ sa
−i = 2h and ˆ sa
−i = 0h are worth considering. By
now the reader must be able to check easily that in all the other conﬁgurations of ˆ sa
−i
player i is indiﬀerent between the two pure strategies.
If ˆ sa
−i = 2h, our player rather reports truthfully her low signal. If she reports ˆ si = h,
everyone invests and she doesn’t learn anything. She computes P(H|l, ˆ sa
−i = 2h) =
p > c. Hence she invests and she gets p − c. If she were to report ˆ si = l, then
ˆ sa = 1h, pessimists compute P(H|l, ˆ sa = 1h) = 1
2 < c and refrain from investing.
Optimists now possess two favourable signals and invest with an equilibrium proba-
bility λo > λ∗. Player i possess two favourable and one unfavourable signal. Since
λo > λ∗ it’s optimal for her to wait and ex ante she gets δW(h,λo) > p − c.
Suppose that ˆ sa
−i = 0h. If she reports her unfavourable signal, then ˆ sa = 1l, optimists
compute P(H|h, ˆ sa = 1l) = 1
2 < c and don’t invest. Since player i does not receive
any additional information, she remains a pessimist, she doesn’t invest and she gets
zero. If she reports ˆ si = h, the aggregate informational value of the opinion poll
25equals one good signal, pessimists compute P(H|l, ˆ sa = 1h) = 1
2 < c and don’t invest
and optimists invest with probability λo. Therefore player i gets δW(l,λo) > 0. To
summarise: if J is uneven and if c ∈ (1
2,p) player i only truthfully reports her low








6.3.3 Uncertainty concerning the number of sampled players.
Suppose it’s as likely that J as J +1 players are present in the opinion poll. Without
loss of generality assume that J is even. From what precedes it should be clear that





















o) > 0 (4)
The lhs of this last inequality was computed for a wide range of parameter values.
The results are shown below:
[Insert here Table Two]
We see again that over our entire parameter range a pessimist always strictly prefers
to report her unfavourable signal. The reader can check that - for the same reason
as the one we explained previously - an optimist also (strictly) prefers to report her
favourable signal.
The intuition is the same as the one we explained when the investment cost is










J+2. Assume that J = 12 and
thus that J
J+2 = 6
7. A pessimistic player only truthfully reveals her bad signal if
6
7[δW(h,λo) − (p − c)] − δW(l,λo) > 0. As before δW(l,λo) represents the cost of
wrongly reporting l (i.e. reporting l if ˆ sa
−i = 0h). δW(h,λo) − (p − c) represents
the gain of rightly reporting l (i.e. reporting l if ˆ sa
−i = 2h). Analytically it’s easy
to see that δW(h,λo) > δW(l,λo) (since an optimistic player expects to hear more
good news out of the waiting game, she faces an ex ante higher value of waiting). If
c is close to p then (p − c) is low and the gain of rightly reporting l outweighs its
cost. It turns out that in ±50% of our simulations (p − c) is relatively high and thus
that 6
7[δW(h,λo) − (p − c)] − δW(l,λo) is a negative number. Assume now that J







all our numerical computations δW(0h,λ∗)−
p2+(1−p)2
2p(1−p) δW(2l,λ∗) is a strictly positive
number. The gain of truthtelling if J is even is that high that it always compensates
the possible loss of truthtelling if J is uneven. Our main conclusion is summarised
below:
Proposition 4 When J ≥ 12 players are simultaneously asked to report their signals
and if it’s unknown whether J or J +1 players are present in the opinion poll, in the
high activity equilibrium and for all our numerical computations with c ∈ (1 − p,p)
there exists a truthtelling equilibrium.
7 Discussion and conclusions.
In this paper we introduced cheap talk in an investment model with information
externalities. If investors focus on the Pareto-dominated equilibrium in the waiting
game (if it exists), then one player has a lot of incentives to truthfully reveal her
signal. This insight is robust if many investors are asked their signals in an opinion
poll because everyone acts in the hope to be the ”pivotal” player who inﬂuences the
investment behaviour of the other players. In the presence of competition eﬀects,
no information can be transmitted via cheap talk. In the presence of small positive
network externalities under mild additional assumptions and in a certain parameter
range the unique equilibrium is the truthtelling one. We believe proposition (1), (3)
and result (4) to be interesting because they show the existence of a truthtelling equi-
librium despite the fact that both senders’ types share similar preferences over the
receivers’ actions. This paper also provides a ﬁrst attempt to introduce competition
eﬀects and positive network externalities in a model of investment with information
externalities. We believe this still constitutes an avenue for future research.
Finally, we also want to discuss some important implications of result (4). CG as-
sumed that 1 − p < c < p. Given this assumption it is natural to focus on the low
activity equilibrium in the waiting game. However this paper shows that even if at the
onset 1− p < c, one may not analyse the eﬃciency of cheap talk by focusing only on
the low activity equilibrium. For, it is possible that, after the communication stage,
even pessimists have incentives to invest. Section seven shows then that ∀c ∈ (1−p,p)
the mere threat that the high activity equilibrium will be triggered suﬃces to give
everyone enough incentives to truthfully reveal their type. If the opinion poll is large
(excluding extremely unlikely sampling errors) opinion polls achieve ﬁrst best. We
can draw two lessons out of this ﬁnding.
27First, it remains to be seen whether Chamley (1997) is robust to the introduction of
cheap talk. That paper considers a continuum of agents endowed with a continuum of
signals and contains interesting insights concerning the rate of convergence of beliefs
under both equilibria. Admittedly, we obtain a truthtelling equilibrium because we
only allow reports to be ∈ {h,l}. For example we should allow the pessimist to report
no signal, i.e. it should be possible for her to say that she has no opinion on that mat-
ter. Clearly, if beliefs are updated under the assumption of truthtelling, a pessimist
prefers to report no signal to her low one, as this leaves the equilibrium strategies of
the optimists unaﬀected (and pessimists remain pessimists and don’t want to invest).
However we cannot enrich the action space of player i without enriching our waiting
game either! How can a message ˆ si = φ be believed if we only allow for optimists
and pessimists in the waiting game? Nonetheless we believe that even in Cham-
ley’s context a lot of useful information can be generated via cheap talk (at least for
a large range of parameter values). Future research may shed some light on this issue.
Second, CG is robust to the introduction of cheap talk. However in a lot of countries
opinion polls exist which ask to entrepreneurs how favourable they think the invest-
ment climate is and whether they intend to invest or not. The mere existence of this
”market for signals” proves its informativeness. Obviously, CG have a hard time ex-
plaining where these opinion polls come from. This paper shows that in CG’s model
people have much more incentives to truthfully reveal their signals than one might
a priori expect. Hence we believe that CG are focusing on the wrong equilibrium
when they describe investment behaviour there where we also observe the existence
of opinion polls.
Appendix
Proof of lemma one:
We present the proof under the assumption that si = h. The other case where si = l
is fully symmetric and is left to the reader by means of an exercise. First note that:
P(H|h,k,λ) =
pb(k;NH − 1,λ)
pb(k;NH − 1,λ) + (1 − p)b(k;NL − 1,λ)
where b(k;NH−1,λ) represents the probability of k investments in NH−1 independent






28Replacing all b(·) by their analytical counterparts20, after simpliﬁcation, we obtain
that the above inequality is always true iﬀ:
(NH − 1 − k1)(NH − 2 − k1)...(NL − k1) > (NH − 1 − k2)(NH − 2 − k2)...(NL − k2)
Both the rhs and the lhs count NH −NL −1 terms. As k2 > k1, the above inequality
is always respected, which proves our lemma. Q.E.D.
Proof of lemma two:
First note that if δ < 1, k
∗ > 0. By contradiction assume that k
∗ = 0. This implies
that A(h,λ) = W(h,λ). But then A(h,λ) > δW(h,λ). Hence k
∗ cannot be equal to
zero. Out of (1) we know that:










For λ∗ to be increasing with p it must be that δ
δpδW(h,λ∗) < 1. From this last
equality we can easily compute that:
δW(h,λ
∗)











k b(k;NH−1,λ) = 1 and since k
∗ > 0, we know that
P
k≥k b(k;NH−1,λ) < 1.
Therefore (5) represents a weighted average of two numbers strictly lower than one.
Therefore δW(h,λ∗)0 < 1 ∀λ∗ and ∀δ < 1. Q.E.D.
Formal exposition of our equilibria under A3.
We ﬁrst compute W(h,λ). Suppose an optimistic player doesn’t invest in period one
and observes k = 0. Our player then computes P(H|h,0,λ). If our player antic-
ipates that no other player will invest in period two, then, if she invests, she gets
P(H|h,0,λ)γ−c. There are two possibilities: P(H|h,0,λ)γ ≤ c and P(H|h,0,λ)γ >
c. If P(H|h,0,λ)γ ≤ c, everyone, after observing k = 0, gets zero. Consider the other
case P(H|h,0,λ)γ > c. The analysis of that case is simpliﬁed by the following lemma:
lemma 3: P(H|h,0,λ∗) < c.
Proof: by contradiction, assume that P(H|h,0,λ∗) ≥ c. Then A(h,λ∗) can impossi-
bly be equal to δW(h,λ∗), because under that assumption:
A(h,λ
∗) = P(k = 0|h,λ
∗)[P(H|h,0,λ










∗) = P(k = 0|h,λ
∗)[P(H|h,0,λ






As γ > 1 and δ < 1, A(h,λ∗) > δW(h,λ∗). Q.E.D.
As, in equilibrium, P(H|h,0,λ) < c we know that in the event that k = 0, all opti-
mists play a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in the second period and invest with
a symmetric probability. In a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium everyone must be in-
diﬀerent between the two pure strategies and therefore all optimists, after observing
k = 0, whether they decide to invest in period two or not, get zero. Therefore W(h,λ)
remains identical to the one of our previous case.
The ex ante payoﬀ of acting given that the other optimists randomise with probability
λ equals:
A(h,λ) = p − c + p(1 − λ)
NH−1(γ − 1) (6)
which is continuous and (strictly) decreasing in λ. This is logical: the lower λ, the
higher the probability that a period-one investor will end up being the only one to
enter the market, the higher the ex ante gain of investing.
A(h,0) = pγ−c > W(h,0) = p−c and A(h,1) < W(h,1). By continuity there exists
a unique symmetric equilibrium strategy in which λ∗
p = 0 and λ∗ ∈ (0,1).











Graph 1: Low activity equilibrium with a ﬁrst mover advantage
Using a reasoning similar to the one we did previously, the reader can also check that
if c ≤ 1 − p, there also exists a high activity equilibrium where λ∗
p = λ∗ = 1.
Finally, note that lemma 2 remains valid here as long as A(h,λ∗)0 > W(h,λ∗)0. From
(6) one can easily see that A(h,λ∗)0 > 1 = W(h,λ∗)0 (from lemma 2). Therefore,
30whenever λ∗
p = 0, λ∗ remains an increasing function of p. Q.E.D.
Formal exposition of our equilibria under A3’.
Call Ξ = {(p,c,δ) :A1 and A2 are satisﬁed}. ∀ (p,c) which satisfy A1, we deﬁne
∆(p,c) = (
p−c
p(1−c),1]. µ(∆) represents the Lebesgue measure of ∆. With positive net-
work externalities it is no longer true that an equilibrium strategy λ∗ always exists.
Therefore we also introduce the following deﬁnition: Ξφ = {(p,c,δ) ∈ Ξ : λ∗ does not
exist}. Ξ−φ = {(p,c,δ) ∈ Ξ : λ∗ exists}.
W(h,λ) remains unaﬀected in this case. To see this suppose all optimists randomise
in period one with the symmetric equilibrium probability λ and consider player j who
is an optimist and who waited in period one. Suppose k = 0. In that case there are
two possibilities: (i) P(H|h,0,λ)γ ≥ c and (ii) P(H|h,0,λ)γ < c. In (i) investing (in
period two) is a dominant strategy for every single investor. Therefore all optimists
invest in the second period and they all get P(H|h,0,λ)−c. In other words in (i) an
optimist knows that she is never going to invest alone in the second period. Therefore
she doesn’t have to bother about network externalities, and her choice is identical to
the one she would have made in our benchmark model. In (ii) there are also two
possibilities: (a) P(H|h,0,λ) ≥ c and (b) P(H|h,0,λ) < c. In (b) no optimist who
waited in period one invests in period two. In (a) there are two stable equilibria:
one where all optimists invest and one where they all abstain21 This issue of multiple
equilibria is not an important one, what really matters is that all optimists always act
together in the second period, thereby realising all gains from network externalities.
Therefore a waiting optimist never bothers about network externalities and her payoﬀ
is identical to the one of our benchmark case.
Henceforth we call A1(h,λ) the gain of acting given that k ≤ 1. A2(h,λ) denotes the
gain of acting given that k ≥ 2. A(h,λ) = A1(h,λ)∪A2(h,λ). Assume k ≤ 1 (remind
that by deﬁnition this means that P(H|h,k = 1,λ) ≥ c). Suppose player j decides to
act in period one and suppose he’s the only one to do so. The other optimists (who
all waited) observe one investment and compute P(H|h,1,λ) ≥ c . Therefore they
all invest in period two and player j gets A1(h,λ) = p − c. Suppose now that k ≥ 2.




P(H,k = i|h,λ) + P(H,k = 0|h,λ)(γ − 1) − c
21There also exists a third equilibrium where the optimists randomise such as to be indiﬀerent
between the two pure strategies. However that third equilibrium is characterised by strategic com-
plementarity and is unstable.
31Note that both A1(h,λ) and A2(h,λ) are continuous in λ. So keeping k ﬁxed, A(h,λ)
is a continuous function ∀k. However at the probability λ2 where P(H|h,2, λ2) = c
(or in words at the probability λ2 where k switches from 1 to 2) A(h,λ) is not a
continuous function because at that probability limλ→λ2A1(h,λ) 6= limλ2←λ A2(h,λ).
Intuitively this discontinuity is due to the fact that k is increasing in λ. If λ is very
low, then an optimist knows that if he invests, this will be interpreted as good news
by the other optimists who will then be induced to invest in the second period as
well. However if λ is not very low then an optimist knows that if he happens to be
the only player to invest at time one, that this will not suﬃce to induce the remaining
optimists to invest in the second period as well. In that case the optimist ”only” gets
γ and not one if Θ = H.





Graph 2: Gain of investing with positive network externalities
This form of A(h,λ) is cumbersome because it entails three diﬃculties. First it is not
sure whether a symmetric low activity equilibrium still exists. As we showed in our
third section, Chamley and Gale’s existence and uniqueness theorem basically rests
on a continuity argumentation. If the functions are not continuous anymore we might






Graph 3: Inexistence of a low activity equilibrium with positive network externalities
32Second, with positive network externalities it is no longer sure whether lemma two
still holds. Lemma two basically states that more optimistic players produce more in-
formation (i.e. invest with a higher equilibrium probability λ∗ at time one). This was
proven by showing that p − c increases faster in p than δW(h,λ). For high enough a
λ, the gain of investing equals A2(h,λ) and A2(h,λ)0 < 1. It is then not sure whether
optimistic players want to produce more information.
Finally, one cannot rule out the issue of multiple equilibria. As both A2(h,λ) and
δW(h,λ) are increasing in λ, we may a priori not rule out the case where A2(h,λ)






Graph 4: Multiple low activity equilibria with positive network externalities
However, our next proposition shows that, as γ → 1, (i) there almost always exists a
PBE, (ii) if a PBE exists, it is unique and (iii) lemma two remains valid.
Proposition 5 Under A1, A2 and A3’:
(i) ∃˜ ∆(˜ p,˜ c) ⊂ ∆(˜ p,˜ c) : ∀δ ∈ ˜ ∆(˜ p,˜ c),(˜ p,˜ c,δ) ∈ Ξφ. If γ → 1, µ(˜ ∆) → 0,
(ii) If γ → 1, if an equilibrium strategy λ∗ exists, it is unique,
(iii) If γ → 1, if δ < 1, if λ∗ exists, it is also increasing in p.
Proof: Before proving these three claims, we ﬁrst rewrite γ → 1 as γ = 1 −  where
 > 0.
We ﬁrst tackle point (ii):
Suppose there exists an equilibrium with k
∗ ≤ 1, which means that p−c = δW(h,λ∗).
From CG we know that in that case the equilibrium is unique. Suppose there exists an
equilibrium with k
∗ ≥ 2, which means that A2(h,λ∗) = δW(h,λ∗). Equation A2(h,λ)
as well as δW(h,λ) are increasing in λ. A suﬃcient condition (though it’s not a
necessary one) for issues of multiple equilibria not to arise is that ∀(p,c,δ) ∈ Ξ,∀λ ∈
[0,1], δ
δλA2(h,λ) < δ
δλδW(h,λ). Call max the maximal value take by δ
δλA2(h,λ),
∀(p,c,δ) ∈ Ξ,∀λ ∈ [0,1]. Call min the minimal value taken by δ
δλδW(h,λ), ∀(p,c,δ) ∈




δA2(h,λ) = (NH − 1)p(1 − λ)
NH−2(1 − γ) > 0
As λ = 0 and as p → 1, max = (NH−1)(1−γ). Unfortunately we cannot analytically
compute δ
δλδW(h,λ), we only know (from Blackwell’s Theorem) that it is strictly pos-
itive. max is a function of γ. If γ = 1, max < min. Call 1 − 1 the value of γ such
that min=max. If  < 1, then max<min and issues of multiple equilibria do not arise.
We next tackle point (iii):
If k
∗ ≤ 1, the proof is identical to the one we saw in lemma 2. Suppose that k
∗ ≥ 2.
In lemma 2 we have shown that if δ < 1, δW(h,λ∗)0 < 1,∀λ∗. We also know that:
δ
δp
A2(h,λ) = 1 − (1 − λ)
NH−1(1 − γ) < 1
A suﬃcient (though not necessary) condition for λ∗ to be increasing in p is that
∀(p,c,δ) ∈ Ξ, ∀λ ∈ [0,1], ∀δ < 122, δ
δpδW(h,λ) < δ
δpA2(h,λ). Unfortunately we
cannot analytically compute the ﬁrst derivative as λ inﬂuences both W(h,λ) and k.
But we know that if δ < 1, δW(h,λ)0 < 1 (over our entire parameter range). Call
max’ the greatest value taken by δW(h,λ)0 over the parameter range (p,c,δ) ∈ Ξ,
∀λ ∈ [0,1], ∀δ < 1. Call min’ the minimal value taken by A2(h,λ), ∀(p,c,δ) ∈ Ξ,
∀λ ∈ [0,1]. min’ is a function of γ. If γ = 1, min’ = 1 > max’. Call 1 − 2 the value
of γ such that: min’ = max’. So if  is strictly lower than 2, min’ > max’.
Finally we consider point (i):
First we assume that  < min{1,2}. Fix any arbitrary (˜ p,˜ c) which satisfy A1. Note
that ∀δ ∈ ∆(˜ p,˜ c),δW(h,0) ≤ A(h,0) and δW(h,1) > A(h,1). Moreover δW(h,λ)
is continuous in λ. If A(h,λ) were also a continuous function in λ, then this would
automatically prove our existence theorem. However A(h,λ) is characterised by one
discontinuity point at λ2. From (ii) we know that if γ → 1, λ∗ does not exist if and
only if A1(h,λ2) > δW(h,λ2) > A2(h,λ2). Note that δW(h,λ) shifts continuously
upwards with every increase in δ. If δ =
˜ p−˜ c
˜ p(1−˜ c),λ∗ = 1 and δW(h,λ2) < A2(h,λ2).
If δ = 1, λ∗ = 0 and δW(h,λ2) > A1(h,λ2). By continuity ∀(˜ p,˜ c) which satisfy A1,
µ˜ ∆(˜ p,˜ c) 6= 0. As γ → 1, A2(h,λ2) → A1(h,λ2) and µ(˜ ∆) → 0. Q.E.D.
22If we would allow δ to equal one then δW(h,0)0 = 1 which is higher than A2(h,0)0 = γ.
34Proof of point (ii) of proposition 3
Assume that with a probability (1−0), β(·) is computed under the assumption that
x = y (where x ∈ (0,1)). However, with a probability 0, β(·) is computed under
the assumption that x = 1 and y = 0. Think of 0 as an arbitrarily small strictly
positive number. This cannot constitute an equilibrium communication strategy. To
see this assume that player i is a pessimist. If she were to report signal h with prob-
ability x ∈ (0,1) then all players compute P(H|sj = ·, ˆ si = ·,x = y) = P(H|sj). As
c ≤ 1−p, by assumption everyone invests and player i gets 1−p−c. However, if she
were to report ˆ si = l with probability one then ex ante with a probability (1−0) she
would also get 1−p−c, while with a probability 0 she would get δW(l,λo) > 1−p−c.
Assume now that with a probability (1−0), β(·) is computed under the assumption
that x = y = 1 (with a probability 0, β(·) is still computed under the assumption
that x = 1 and y = 0). Assume player i is a pessimist. Suppose she reports ˆ si = l.
In that case P(H|·, ˆ si = l,x = y = 1) doesn’t exist. Under ER all players believe
that she is a pessimist and player i gets δW(l,λo) > 1 − p − c. Hence x = y = 1
can’t be an equilibrium strategy either. For similar reasons x = y = 0 can also not be
an equilibrium strategy because the pessimist has now an incentive to report signal h.
Hence, under ER and if there exists a probability 0 that all players will revise their
priors under the assumption that x = y = 1, no pooling equilibria in the communica-
tion game exist. We now show by contradiction that an informative communication
strategy where with a probability equal to one β(·) is computed under the assump-
tion that x ≥ y, and where x 6= 1 and/or y 6= 0 cannot be an equilibrium strategy
either. We know that in equilibrium P(H|l, ˆ si = h,x ≥ y) ≥ c otherwise a pessimist
strictly prefers to report h to l. If a pessimist reports ˆ si = l, optimists compute
P(H|h, ˆ si = l,x ≥ y) and randomise with probability , say ˆ λ (0 < ˆ λ < λ∗). If she
were to report ˆ si = h, then everyone would invest and she would get 1 − p − c. As
1−p−c < δW(l, ˆ λ) a pessimist cannot be indiﬀerent reporting h or l. Hence y∗ = 0.
x∗ < 1 iﬀ optimists are willing to randomise between reporting h or l. But this con-
tradicts our ﬁnding that p − c > A2(h,λo).
Appendix Two
In this appendix we detail our way of working when a pessimist’s gain of truthfully
revealing her bad signal is numerically computed. We ﬁrst simplify equation (3) by
computing analytically the diﬀerent weights. We start with
P(ˆ s−i=1l|l,J)
P(ˆ s−i=1h|l,J).
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2p(1−p) and is independent of J. Next we compute
P(ˆ s−i=0h|l,J+1)
P(ˆ s−i=1h|l,J) :
















P(ˆ s−i = 0h|l,J + 1)




















which is also independent of J. Finally we compute
P(ˆ s−i=2l|l,J+1)
P(ˆ s−i=1h|l,J) :





2 +1(1 − p)
J











2 −1(1 − p)
J
2 −1[p
3 + (1 − p)
3]
Therefore,
P(ˆ s−i = 2l|l,J + 1)




2 +1[p3 + (1 − p)3]
2C
J
2 J−1p(1 − p)
=
J[p3 + (1 − p)3]
(J + 2)p(1 − p)
We replace
P(ˆ s−i=2l|l,J+1)
P(ˆ s−i=1h|l,J) in (3) by its heighest possible value namely by
p3+(1−p)3
p(1−p) . A
suﬃcient (though not necessary) condition for truthtelling ∀J ≥ 2 is thus that the










p3 + (1 − p)3
p(1 − p)
δW(3l,λo) > 0
The lhs of this inequality was numerically computed for diﬀerent values of our ex-
ogenous parameters. For example assume that p = 0.6, c = 0.42 and δ = 0.8.
We computed the diﬀerent equilibrium probabilities and the diﬀerent ex ante gains
of waiting. In this example λ∗ = 0.17 and λo = 0,0383. δW(l,λo) = 0,03548,
δW(3l,λo) = 0,003836, δW(0h,λ∗) = 0,1289 and δW(2l,λ∗) = 0,05277. If J is
even then: 0,1289 − 0,08 − 1.08333.0,05277 = −0,00827. This number is negative
which means that in this example if J is commonly known to be even there is no
truthtelling equilibrium. However if it is equiprobable that J or J + 1 players are
interviewed, then a pessimistic player must add 0,03548 − 1,1666.0,003838 = 0,031
to that negative number. 0,031 − 0,00827 = 0,023 is a positive number. Hence in
36this example pessimists want to truthfully reveal their bad signals.
We now detail our way of working when c ∈ (1
2,p). Equation (4) also represents a
weighted average of diﬀerent gains of waiting. We ﬁrst simplify
P(ˆ s−i=2h|l,J+1)
P(ˆ s−i=1h|l,J) . We
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Assume that J = 1223. In that case a truthtelling equilibrium ∀J ≥ 12 if c ∈ (1
2,p)
exists if the following inequality is respected:
δW(0h,λ
∗) −







o) − (p − c)] − δW(l,λ
o) > 0
This inequality was computed for diﬀerent values of our exogenous parameters. The
results are summarized in table two. For example if p = 0,7, c = 0,65 and δ =
0,9, then λ∗ = 0,0066 and λo = 0,055. Equation (4) then becomes: 0,007443 −
1,381.0,000049 + 6
7[0,125 − 0,05] − 0,023 ' 0,0487 which is the number reported
in the table. This last number is positive which indicates that a pessimist strictly
prefers to report her low signal.
23If J would be less than 12, then we do not obtain the existence of a truthtelling equilibrium for
our entire parameter range.
37Table 1:
Computation of the gain of truhtful reporting for a pessimist in an opinion poll (in
procentual terms).
δ = 0.9 δ = 0.8
c p 0.55 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.55 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.48 1.6 3.3 7.4 12.4 0.34 1.5 3.5 8 13 (**)
0.42 (*) 2.7 5.9 10.2 (**) (*) 2.3 6.1 (**) (**)
0.35 (*) (*) 5.1 8.59 (**) (*) (*) 4.6 (**) (**)
0.25 (*) (*) (*) (**) (**) (*) (*) (**) (**) (**)
δ = 0.7 δ = 0.6
c p 0.55 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.55 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.48 1.3 3.4 7.8 (**) (**) 1.2 3 (**) (**) (**)
0.42 (*) 1.8 3.7 (**) (**) (*) 0.92 (**) (**) (**)
0.35 (*) (*) (**) (**) (**) (*) (**) (**) (**) (**)
0.25 (**) (**) (**) (**) (**) (**) (**) (**) (**) (**)
If a number in the table is strictly positive, this means that a pessimist strictly prefers to truthfully
report her signal if J ≥ 2 and if she believes the other players will do so too for the given set of
exogenous variables.
(*) A1 not respected,
(**) A2 not respected.
38Table 2:
Computation of the gain of truhtful reporting for a pessimist in an opinion poll (in
procentual terms).
δ = 0.9 δ = 0.8
c p 0.55 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.55 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.75 (*) (*) (*) 6.33 7.74 (*) (*) (*) 6.14 6.39
0.65 (*) (*) 4.87 6.46 10.2 (*) (*) 4.47 6.03 9.67
0.58 (*) 2.82 4.44 7.84 12.7 (*) 2.6 4.15 7.16 (**)
0.52 1.02 2.06 4.83 9.01 14.8 0.89 1.71 3.95 7.6 (**)
δ = 0.7 δ = 0.6
c p 0.55 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.55 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.75 (*) (*) (*) 5.05 5.95 (*) (*) (*) 4.04 (**)
0.65 (*) (*) 4.07 5.42 (**) (*) (*) 3.25 4.33 (**)
0.58 (*) 2.45 3.46 5.67 (**) (*) 1.91 2.47 (**) (**)
0.52 0.77 1.07 2.69 (**) (**) 0.4 0.15 0.95 (**) (**)
If a number in the table is strictly positive, this means that a pessimist strictly prefers to truthfully
report her signal if J ≥ 12 and if she believes the other players will do so too for the given set of
exogenous variables.
(*) A1 not respected,
(**) A2 not respected.
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